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1.Introduction 
Given recurrent devastating violent terror attacks and horrible bloodshed in many parts of  the 
world, much significant empirical research has been done in recent years to document the effects 
of  terror attacks on financial markets. Researchers have concentrated on studying three broad 
questions using various methodological approaches: how terror attacks affect financial-market 
returns, how the volatility of  financial-market prices responds to terror attacks, and how shocks 
triggered by terror attacks transmit internationally. Our contribution to the literature on the 
effects of  terror attacks on stock markets is that we use a novel nonparametric causality-in-
quantiles test recently developed by Balcilar et al. (forthcoming) to reexamine these three 
questions using data for the G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom (UK), and the United States (U.S.)). 
The nonparametric causality-in-quantiles test combines elements of  the test for nonlinear 
causality of  k-th order developed by Nishiyama et al. (2011) with the causality-in-quantiles test 
developed by Jeong et al. (2012) and, hence, can be considered to be a generalization of  the 
former. The causality-in-quantile approach has the following three novelties: Firstly, it is robust 
to misspecification errors as it detects the underlying dependence structure between the 
examined time series, which could prove to be particularly important as it is well known that 
stock returns display nonlinear dynamics (see Bekiros et al., forthcoming, for a detailed 
discussion in this regard). Secondly, via this methodology, we are able to test not only for 
causality-in-mean (1st moment), but also for causality that may exist in the tails of  the joint 
distribution of  the variables, which in turn, is important if  the dependent variable has fat-tails – 
something we show below to hold for stock returns. Finally, we are also able to investigate 
causality-in-variance and, thus, study higher-order dependencies. Such an investigation is 
imporant because, during some periods, causality in the conditional-mean may not exist while, at 
the same time, higher-order interdependencies may turn out to be significant. Moreover, it is well 
known that the response of  stock markets is not uniform across terror attacks. Earlier 
researchers (Chesney et al. 2011) have found that some terror attacks trigger extreme stock-
market movements while others do not. This finding warrants a closer investigation of  the effect 
of  terror attacks across the entire conditional distribution of  stock returns, something that we do 
in this research by means of  the nonparametric causality-in-quantiles test.  
Note that, nonlinear causality tests and GARCH models used in the liteature to analyze the 
impact of  terror attacks on stock returns and/or volatility, rely on conditional-mean based 
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estimation, and hence fail to capture the entire conditional distribution of  stock returns and 
volatility – something we can do with our approach. In the process, our test is a more general 
procedure of  detecting causality in both returns and volatility simultaneously at each point of  the 
respective conditional distributions. Hence, we are able to capture existence or non-existence of  
causality at various phases (bear (lower quantiles), normal (median) and bull (upper quantiles)) of  
the stock markets. Being a more general test, our method is more likely to pick up causality when 
conditional mean-based tests might fail to do so.  In addition, because we do not need decide on 
the number of  regimes as in a Markov-switching model, and can test for causality at each point 
of  the conditional distribution characterizing specific regimes, our test also does not suffer from 
any misspecification in terms of   specifying and testing for the optimal the number of  regimes.     
Our findings can be summarized as follows: First, the effects of  terror attacks on stock-market 
returns are significant in several cases while the effects on volatility are only significant in few 
cases, notably for Japan and the UK. For Japan, we find that the effect of  a terror attack on the 
volatility of  stock returns is asymmetric in the sense that the effect is stronger in terms of  
significance for the upper quantiles than for the lower quantiles of  the distribution of  stock-
return volatility. For the UK, the causality is also to some extent asymmetric, but mainly holds at 
certain quantiles around the median. For France, neither the effect on returns nor the effect on 
volatility is significant. Second, evidence of  effects of  terror attacks on stock-market returns 
becomes stronger for the lower and the upper quantiles of  the conditional distribution of  stock-
market returns, while the effect is insignificant in the majority of  cases around the median. 
Hence, the strength of  the significance of  causality effects across quantiles can be described in 
terms of  a u-shaped curve. Third, in terms of  cross-border effects of  terror attacks, we find a 
similar u-shaped curve for the effects of  terror attacks that took place in the U.S. on stock-
market returns in the other G7 countries. Again, Japan and the UK are exceptions insofar as the 
effects on the volatility of  stock returns are concerned, and for France all effects are insignificant 
for all quantiles. Fourth, further in terms of  international repercussions, we find that terror 
attacks that originated in the other G7 countries had a significant effect on the lower and upper 
quantiles of  the conditional distribution of  U.S. stock-market returns, giving again rise to a u-
shaped curve that highlights the impact of  such terror attacks on the tails of  the conditional 
distribution of  U.S. stock-market returns. We find no evidence of  a significant effect of  terror 
attacks in other G7 countries on U.S. stock-market volatility, consistent with results reported in 
earlier research. 
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We structure the remainder of  this research as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature on 
terror attacks and financial markets. In Section 3, we describe the nonparametric causality-in-
quantiles test. In Section 4, we describe our data and we summarize our results. In Section 5, we 
conclude. 
 
2. A Brief  Literature Review 
Research on the effects of  terror attacks on financial markets has made significant progress in 
recent years. One approach that features prominent in this strand of  research is the event-study 
approach approach. Based on an event-study approach, Karolyi and Martell (2005) find that the 
effect of  terror attacks on stock markets is larger when such attacks hit firms in rich and 
democratic countries, and that kidnapping of  company executives result in larger negative stock 
returns than bombings of  facilities or buildings. Chen and Siems (2004) use an event-study 
approach to show that U.S. financial markets recover quicker from the disruptions brought about 
by a terror attack than financial markets in several other countries. They also document that U.S. 
financial markets have become more resilient in recent decades with respect to terror attacks and 
attribute this finding to stable liquidity provision by the banking/financial sector. 
Differences in the response to terror attacks across stock markets have also been reported by 
Kollias et al. (2011a). Upon combing an event-study approach with an analysis of  GARCH 
models, they study the effects on general stock-market indices and across stock-market sectors 
of  the terror attacks that took place on March11th, 2004 in Madrid and July 7th, 2005 in 
London. As for the general stock-market indices, they find that the London market recovered 
much faster than the Madrid market. They also find that returns on the day of  the terror attacks 
were significantly negative for the majority of  sectors in both markets, and that the overall effect 
of  the terror attacks on stock-market returns and volatility was transitory (for an analysis based 
on forecasts of  individual investors showing the expected transitory effects of  the September 11 
terror attacks, see Glaser and Weber 2005). Results that Kollias et al. (2011b) report based on a 
comparative analysis of  the London and Athens stock markets using an event-study approach 
and GARCH models indicate that market size and maturity and specific attributes of  terror 
attacks help to explain the differential response of  stock markets to terror attacks. 
Chesney et al. (2008) study the impact of  several significant terror attacks on international stock 
markets, bond markets, and commodity markets using an event-study approach, a non-
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parametric approach, and a GARCH-based approach. They also compare the impact of  terror 
attacks with the effects of  natural disasters and financial crashes. They report that terror attacks 
often have a significant negative effect on stock markets, where terror attacks also affect stock 
markets at the industry level (e.g., indexes of  the insurance and airline industries). The sign of  
the effect of  terror attacks on gold and bond markets is leass clear-cut, showing, for example, 
that the hedging and safe-haven property often attributed to gold investments may not always 
work in the wake of  terror attacks. In this regard, results that Fernandez (2008) reports are 
interesting. Upon using wavelet and a semi-parametric fractional autoregressive model, he finds 
that the volatility of  an index of  gold and silver significantly increased at around the beginning 
of  the Iraq war in 2002-2003. Thereafter, volatility exhibited a trend decline. Similarly, the 
volatility of  major stock-market indexes increased at the beginning of  the Iraq war and then 
started declining. Trends in stock-market volatility in developing countries (in Egypt in 
particular), in turn, show a different pattern. Differences with regard to the response to terror 
attacks in terms of  returns and volatility of  stock returns across stock markets of  developed and 
developing economies (Middle East and North Africa economies in particular) have also been 
reported by Nikkinen et al. (2008). 
Drakos (2004) studies the impact of  the terror attacks of  September 11 on airline stocks. Based 
on the classic market model, he reports evidence of  a structural shift in the beta factors of  
airline stocks, reflecting a significant increase in systematic risk. He also finds that, while 
idiosyncratic risk of  investments in airline stocks has increased, the contribution of  systematic 
risk to total risk has subtsantially increased. While a negative effect of  terror attacks on the 
returns of  airline stocks may reflect a deterioration of  business conditions in the airline sector, 
results reported by Drakos (2010) suggest that psychosocial factors may also play a role for the 
magnitude and significance of  terror attacks on stock returns. Upon studying an international 
panel of  stock markets, he finds that terror attacks depress returns on the day of  a terror attack, 
and that this depressing effect tends to be particularly strong for terror attacks that have a major 
psychosocial effect.  
Focusing on terror attacks in Isreal, Eldor and Melnick (2004) find that the impact of  Palestinian 
terror attacks on the stock market and the exchange rate in Israel did not decline over time, 
indicating that there is no “routine of  terror attacks” (page 385). The authors study a large 
sample of  terror attacks, and they account for the location of  an attack (e.g., Jerusalem), the 
target type (e.g., military), and the attack type (e.g., suicide bombing). They find that suicide 
attacks, the number of  victims injured, and the number of  victims killed had a permanent effect 
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on the stock market, but also that such attacks did not impair the efficient functioning of  
financial markets. Similarly, Johnston and Nedelescu (2005) argue that liquid and sound financial 
markets efficiently absorb the effects of  terror attacks, but they also emphasize the key role the 
regulatory framework in place and the response of  authorities play for mitigating the effect of  a 
terror attack on financial markets. 
Arin et al. (2008) estimate a bivariate GARCH-in-mean model on data for six different countries 
and find significant causal effects of  terror attacks on the mean and the volatility of  stock 
returns, where they also document that the effects of  terror attacks on stock-market fluctuations 
in the European countries in their sample are somewhat smaller than the effects observed for the 
emerging market economies other countries being studied. Chuliá et al. (2007) also study a 
bivariate variate GARCH model. They analyze how terror attacks affect volatility transmission 
between the U.S. and European stock markets. They find that, while there is evidence of  
bidirectional volatility transmission, the terror attack that hit New York on September 11, 2001 
affected volatility in European markets, whereas the terror attacks that hit London and Madrid 
on March 11, 2004 and July 7, 2005 did not affect the volatility of  the U.S. stock market. Hon et 
al. (2004), in turn, use a correlation analysis and a GARCH model to show that the terror attack 
of  September 11, 2001 led to a strong increase in the comovement of  international stock 
markets (and that volatility did not increase). The authors conclude that market participants 
across the world interpreted the terror attack as an international shock. Another application of  a 
bivariate GARCH model can be found in research by Kollias et al. (2013). They estimate 
bivariate vector autoregressive GARCH-in-mean models to analyze the effects of  terror attacks 
on the returns, variance, and covariance of  stock and bond returns in four European countries 
(France, Germany, Spain, and United Kingdom).  
In terms of  the overall economic effects of  terrorism, Abadie und Gardeazabal (2003) show, 
based on data for the Basque Country, that terrorism can have quantitatively substantial 
economic costs. They also show that, when the 1998–1999 truce became credible, stocks of  
firms with intense business in the Basque Country exhibited a positive relative performance, 
which turned negative when it became clear that the truce would come to an end. Similarly, 
Barros and Gil-Alana (2009) report that terror attacks have a negative and significant effect on 
the returns on a Basque stock market index, while the impact of  terror attacks on volatility is 
positive but insignificant. In order to explain theoretically large overall economic effects of  
terrorism, Abadie und Gardeazabal (2008) develop a continuous-time stochastic open-economy 
model and find that changes in the intensity of  terror attacks, though their direct effect on a 
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country’s capital stock may be small, have the potential to trigger large cross-border movements 
of  capital. The reason is that, in their model, terror attacks affect the expected returns on 
investments, implying that international investors with a low level of  risk aversion abruptly 
change their international investment plans in response to changes in the intensity of  terror 
attacks. They show that this effect is stronger, for a given degree of  investors’ risk aversion, in a 
globalized world economy in which the number of  countries is large. The empirical evidence that 
they present is in line with their model. Upon using cross-country regressions and accounting for 
the influence of  several control variables, they find that terror risk exerts a negative effect on net 
foreign investment positions. 
 
3.Testing for Causality-in-Quantiles 
We present a novel test, as proposed by Balcilar et al. (forthcoming), for the detection of  
nonlinear causality via a hybrid approach based on the frameworks of  Nishiyama et al. (2011) and 
Jeong et al. (2012). As in Jeong et al. (2012), the variable 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 (terror attacks index) does not cause 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 (stock returns) in the  𝜃𝜃-quantile with respect to the lag-vector of  
�𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1, … , 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝,𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝�  if1  
𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃�𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡�𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1, … , 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝,𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝� = 𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃�𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡�𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1, … ,𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝�                                  (1) 
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 causes 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 in the 𝜃𝜃-th  quantile with respect to �𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1, … , 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝,𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝�  if 
 𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃�𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡�𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1, … ,𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝� ≠ 𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃�𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡�𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1, … , 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝�                               (2) 
where 𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡| ∙) = 𝜃𝜃-th  quantile of  𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 depending on t and 0 < 𝜃𝜃 < 1. In terms of  notation, we 
let 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1 ≡ (𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1, … ,𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝), 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 ≡ (𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−𝑝𝑝), and 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 = (𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡); and 𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1) 
and 𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1)  denote the conditional distribution of  𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 given 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1 and 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1, 
respectively, where 𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1) is assumed to be absolutely continuous in 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 for almost all 
𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1. Upon defining  𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃(𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1) ≡ 𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1)  and 𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1) ≡ 𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1), we have 
𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1{𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃(𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1} = 𝜃𝜃 with probability one. Consequently, the hypotheses to be tested 
based on the definitions in Eqs. (1) and (2) are 
𝐻𝐻0 = 𝑃𝑃�𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1{𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1} = 𝜃𝜃� = 1,  (3) 
𝐻𝐻1 = 𝑃𝑃�𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1{𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1} = 𝜃𝜃� < 1.  (4) 
                                                          
1 The exposition in this section closely follows Nishiyama et al. (2011) and Jeong et al. (2012). 
7 
 
Jeong et al. (2012) use the distance measure  𝐽𝐽 = {𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸(𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1)𝑓𝑓𝑍𝑍(𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1)}, where 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 = regression 
error and 𝑓𝑓𝑍𝑍(𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1) = marginal density function of  𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1.  The regression error emerges based 
on the null in Eq. (3), which can only be true if  and only if    𝐸𝐸[𝟏𝟏{𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1}] = 𝜃𝜃 or, 
equivalently, 𝟏𝟏{𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1)} = 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 , where  𝟏𝟏{∙} = indicator function. Jeong et al. (2012) 
specify the distance measure, 𝐽𝐽 ≥ 0, as follows: 
𝐽𝐽 = 𝐸𝐸 ��𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1{𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1} − 𝜃𝜃�2𝑓𝑓𝑍𝑍(𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1)�.  (5) 
We have  𝐽𝐽 = 0 if  and only if  𝐻𝐻0 in Eq. (3) is true, while 𝐽𝐽 > 0 holds under 𝐻𝐻1 in Eq. (4). Jeong 
et al. (2012) show that the feasible kernel-based test statistic for 𝐽𝐽 has the following form: 
                 𝐽𝐽𝑇𝑇 = 1𝑇𝑇(𝑇𝑇−1)ℎ2𝑝𝑝 ∑ ∑ 𝐾𝐾 �𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1 −𝑍𝑍𝑠𝑠−1ℎ � 𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑠 ,        𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠=𝑝𝑝+1,𝑠𝑠≠𝑡𝑡                                                𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=𝑝𝑝+1 (6) 
where 𝐾𝐾(∙) = kernel function with bandwidth ℎ, 𝑇𝑇 = sample size, 𝑝𝑝 = lag-order, and 𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡 = 
estimate of  the regression error, computed as 
𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡 = 𝟏𝟏�𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑄𝑄�𝜃𝜃(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1)� − 𝜃𝜃.  (7) 
We use a nonparametric kernel method to estimate the 𝜃𝜃-th conditional quantile of  𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 given 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1 as 𝑄𝑄�𝜃𝜃(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1) = 𝐹𝐹�𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1−1 (𝜃𝜃|𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1), where 𝐹𝐹�𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1)=Nadarya-Watson kernel estimator: 
                      𝐹𝐹�𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡|𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1) = ∑ 𝐿𝐿�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1−𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠−1ℎ �𝟏𝟏(𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠≤𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠=𝑝𝑝+1,𝑠𝑠≠𝑡𝑡∑ 𝐿𝐿�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1−𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠−1
ℎ
�𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠=𝑝𝑝+1,𝑠𝑠≠𝑡𝑡 ,                             (8) 
with 𝐿𝐿(∙)=the kernel function and ℎ the bandwidth.  
In an extension of  the Jeong et al. (2012) framework, we develop a test for the 2nd 
moment. To this end, we use the nonparametric Granger-quantile-causality approach by 
Nishiyama et al. (2011). In order to illustrate the causality in higher order moments, we assume 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑔𝑔(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝜎𝜎(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1)𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 , (9) 
where 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡= white noise process, and  𝑔𝑔(∙) and  𝜎𝜎(∙)= unknown functions that satisfy certain 
conditions for stationarity. This specification does not allow for Granger-type causality testing 
from 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 to 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, but could possibly detect the “predictive power” from 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 to 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡
2 when  𝜎𝜎(∙) is 
a general nonlinear function. Hence, the Granger causality-in-variance definition does not require 
an explicit specification of  squares for 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1. We re-formulate Eq. (9) into a null and alternative 
hypothesis for causality in variance as follows: 
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𝐻𝐻0 = 𝑃𝑃 �𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡2|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1{𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1} = 𝜃𝜃� = 1,       (10) 
𝐻𝐻1 = 𝑃𝑃 �𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡2|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1{𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1} = 𝜃𝜃� < 1.       (11) 
To obtain a feasible test statistic for testing the null hypothesis in Eq. (10), we replace 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 in Eq. 
(6) - (8) with 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡2 (squared stock returns, i.e., volatility). Incorporating the Jeong et al. (2012) 
approach, we overcome the problem that causality in the conditional 1st moment (mean) imply 
causality in the 2nd moment (variance). Specifically, we interpret the causality in higher-order 
moments using the following model: 
𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑔𝑔(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡.            (12) 
Thus, higher order quantile causality can be specified as:  
                 𝐻𝐻0 = 𝑃𝑃 �𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1{𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1} = 𝜃𝜃� = 1       for 𝑘𝑘 = 1,2, … ,𝐾𝐾, (13)     
                   𝐻𝐻1 = 𝑃𝑃 �𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1{𝑄𝑄𝜃𝜃(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1)|𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡−1} = 𝜃𝜃� < 1      for 𝑘𝑘 = 1,2, … ,𝐾𝐾.  (14)  
Integrating the entire framework, we define that 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 Granger causes 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 in quantile 𝜃𝜃 up to the 𝐾𝐾-th 
moment utilizing Eq. (13) to construct the test statistic of  Eq. (6) for each 𝑘𝑘. However, it can be 
shown that it is not easy to combine the different statistics for each 𝑘𝑘 = 1,2, … ,𝐾𝐾 into one 
statistic for the joint null in Eq. (13) because the statistics are mutually correlated (Nishiyama et 
al. 2011). To efficiently address this issue, we include a sequential-testing method as described by 
Nishiyama et al. (2011) with some modifications. Firstly, we test for nonparametric Granger 
causality in the 1st moment (𝑘𝑘 = 1). Failure to reject the null for 𝑘𝑘 = 1, does not automatically 
lead to noncausality in the 2nd moment and, thus, we construct the tests for 𝑘𝑘 = 2. Finally, we 
test for the existence of  causality-in-variance, or the causality-in-mean and variance successively. 
The empirical implementation of  the causality-in-quantiles test requires specifying the bandwidth 
ℎ, the lag order 𝑝𝑝, and the kernel type for 𝐾𝐾(∙) and 𝐿𝐿(∙) in Eq. (6) and (8). We determine the lag 
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order using the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC).2 The bandwidth is selected using the least 
squares cross-validation method. For 𝐾𝐾(∙) and 𝐿𝐿(∙), we use Gaussian kernels.  
4. Data and empirical results 
4.1. Data 
Our analysis is based on two daily variables: stock-market returns and an index of  terror attacks 
for the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, and U.S.) countries. Using stock-market 
returns ensures that the dependent variable is stationary – a requirement for our causality 
analysis.3 The terror index (discussed below) is stationary by design. Stock-market returns are 
measured in terms of  the first-differenced of  the natural log of  the stock-market index of  each 
of  the G7 countries, where we obtained the data on the stock-market indexes from Bloomberg. 
Like Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) and Arin et al., (2008), the daily terror index is defined as the 
natural logarithm of  (e+number of  human casualties+number of  people injured+number of  terrorist 
attacks), that occurred each day and where e denotes the exponential function.  As in Arin et al., 
(2008), terror attacks which occurred during a weekend were summed up to the previous Friday’s 
figure.4 Data on the terror attacks were collected from the RAND Database of  Worldwide 
Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI)5 and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)6. The RDWTI and 
GTD integrate data from many important terrorism resources. Figure 1 displays the stock-
market indexes and the data on terror attacks and Table 1 shows some summary statistics of  the 
data. As can be seen, both variables are non-normal with heavy tails, which, in turn, provides 
some preliminary justification for using the causality-in-quantiles test. 
-- Please insert Figure 1 and Table 1 about here. -- 
Given data availability on stock-market indexes and terror indexes, with the former driving the 
start date and the latter the end date of  our samples, our samples cover the following periods 
after matching the dates of  the two variables, Canada: 3rd, January, 1977 to 31st December, 2014 
(9,566 observations); France: 10th, July, 1987 to 31st December, 2014 (6,950 observations); 
                                                          
2 The SIC is known to select a parsimonious number of  lags and, thereby, prevents overparameterization problems 
associated with nonparametric approaches. Hurvich and Tsai (1989) examine the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and show that it is biased towards selecting an overparameterized model, while the SIC is asymptotically 
consistent. A lag-length of  one was chosen in all cases, which, in turn, is consistent with the standard predictive 
regression framework used to predict stock returns (Rapach and Zhou, 2013). 
3 Details of  the unit-root tests are available upon request from the authors. 
4 This equation means that the index takes a value of 1 on days when there are no terror attacks. We follow the 
papers by Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) and Arin et al., (2008) in this regard. 
5 Available freely for download from: http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents.html. 
6 Available freely for download from: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. 
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Germany: 23rd, February, 1968 to 31st December, 2014 (11,785 observations); Italy: 2nd, January, 
1998 to 31st December, 2014 (4,311 observations); Japan: 6th, January, 1970 to 31st December, 
2014 (11,095 observations); UK: 3rd, January, 1984 to 31st December, 2014 (7,848 observations) 
and; US: 26th, February, 1968 to 31st December, 2014 (11,795 observations). 
4.2. Main Results 
Our analysis comes in three parts: We study (i) the impact of  the terror index of  a country on 
stock-market returns and volatility of  that country, (ii) the impact of  terror attacks on the U.S. on 
stock-market returns and volatility of  the other G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, and UK) countries, and, (iii) the impact of  terror attacks on Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, and the UK on U.S. stock-market returns and volatility. 7 Because the data on terror 
attacks start on 21st February, 1968, the analysis of  the third part of  the analysis starts on the 
starting date of  the U.S. data. For the other two parts, the sample period covered are as discussed 
in the preceding paragraph.8 
-- Please insert Figure 2 about here. -- 
Figure 2 summarizes the results of  the non-parametric causality-in-quantiles tests when we 
regress a countries stock-market returns / volatility on the terror index of  that country. The 
horizontal axis shows the quantiles and the vertical axis shows the test results. The grey 
horizontal line represents the 95% critical value. The bright solid line represents the results for 
stock-market returns and the dark dashed line represents the results for volatility. For Canada, 
Germany, Italy, the UK, and the U.S., the solid thick line for stock-market returns has a 
characteristic u-shaped pattern, implying that the evidence of  significant causal effects of  terror 
attacks becomes stronger in the tails of  the conditional distribution of  stock-market returns. 
While for Germany the effect of  terror attacks is significant also for quantiles around the median 
                                                          
7 To motivate the quantile-based model from a statistical perspective, we also conducted the Koenker and Bassett’s 
(1982) test of  slope homogeneity, and the null of  equality of  slopes across the quantiles were overwhelmingly 
rejected in all cases at the highest level of  significance. Complete details of  these results are available upon request 
from the authors. 
8 As a starting point, we also conducted linear Granger-noncausality tests for the three parts of  our analysis. 
However, we were not able to detect any predictability running from the terror indices to stock-market returns in 
any of  three parts, possibly due to a misspecification of  the linear model. When we applied the Brock et al., (1996, 
BDS) test to the residuals of  the equation linking linking stock-market returns to the terror index, the null 
hypothesis of  iid residuals was rejected, implying evidence of  uncaptured nonlinearity between these two variables. 
In addition, the Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) tests (Sup-F, Exp-F and Mean-F) of  parameter 
instability (break point) rejected the null hypothesis of  stability in all equations. The results from the nonlinearity 
and parameter-stability tests show that it is worthwhile to use a nonlinear approach to study causality, which is what 
we do via the causality-in-quantiles test. Complete details of  the standard Granger causality, the BDS, and Andrews 
(1993), and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) tests are available upon request from the authors.   
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of  the conditional distribution of  stock-market returns, the effects become significant only for 
the lower and upper quantiles in the cases of  the other countries. For France, we observe no 
significant causal effect, irrespective of  whether we study stock-market returns or volatility. For 
Japan, in turn, we observe significant causal effects of  terror attacks only on volatility but not on 
stock-market returns. Moreover, the causal effects on volatility are asymmetric because they are 
significant for the upper quantiles of  the conditional distribution of  volatility and insignificant 
for the lower quantiles. For the UK, causality in volatility holds at certain quantiles around the 
median. None of  the remaining five countries show any evidence of  volatility predictability 
emanating from terror attacks. 
-- Please insert Figure 3 about here. -- 
Figure 3 summarizes the results of  the non-parametric causality-in-quantiles tests when we 
regress a countries stock-market returns / volatility on the U.S. terror index. For Canada, 
Germany, Italy, and the UK, there is strong evidence of  significant causal cross-border effects of  
U.S. terror attacks onto the lower and upper quantiles of  the conditional distribution of  stock-
market returns. The stock market of  France, in turn, seems to be largely insulated from U.S. 
terror attacks. In terms of  volatility, there is evidence of  a causal international spillover effect 
only in the case of  Japan and the UK at several quantile above the median primarily. 
-- Please insert Figure 4 about here. -- 
Figure 4 summarizes the results of  the non-parametric causality-in-quantiles tests when we 
regress U.S. stock-market returns / volatility on the terror indexes of  the other G7 countries. 
The results are very similar across countries. The results show that there is no evidence of  
international repercussions as far as volatility is concerned. For stock-market returns, in turn, we 
observe the characteristic u-shaped curve similar to the curve that we already found in the other 
parts of  our empirical analysis. 
4.3. Robustness Checks 
Based on the suggestions of  two anonymous referees, we conducted the following robustness 
checks:  
(i) We conducted the nonlinear test of  causality developed by Diks and Panchenko 
(2005) on the returns, as well as a GARCH model estimation. The GARCH model 
showed no evidence of  the lagged terror index in causing either returns or volatility 
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for all the cases under the three scenarios discussed above. The Diks and Panchenko 
(2005) test detected some evidence of  causality in returns, highlighting the 
importance of  nonlinearity missed by the GARCH model. Specifically, we find 
causality for Germany and US only under the case of  own terror attacks on own 
stock returns (compared to quantile causality at certain quantiles for all cases except 
France), causality in all cases except Japan when it comes to terror attacks in these 
countries causing US stock returns (compared to quantile causality at certain 
quantiles for all cases), and US terror attacks only causing Canadian stock returns 
(compared to quantile causality at certain quantiles for all cases except France). In 
light of  relatively weaker evidence obtained from the Diks and Panchenko (2005) test 
and the GARCH model compared to our causality-in-quantiles test, and these models 
being less informative based on conditional-mean (and hence, unable to capture 
market phases), these results have not been formally reported in the paper to save 
space. However, complete details of  these results are available upon request from the 
authors;  
 
(ii) We use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) rather than the SIC to choose our 
lag-length. In general, there were virtually no differences in our results compared to 
those under the SIC. A couple of  exceptions related with Japan involved causality 
being observed now due to own terror attacks, and US terror attacks under the AIC. 
Also, the effect of  G6 terror attacks on US returns seemed to be stronger under the 
SIC, though causal structure was unaffected, suggesting that the effect of  terror 
attacks tends to die down at longer lags picked up by the AIC. Complete details of  
these results are available upon request from the authors, and have not been reported 
to save space;  
(iii) We estimated univariate GARCH models as a measure of  conditional volatility and 
used it instead of  the squared returns as a measure of  volatility. In general, results are 
similar across squared returns and the GARCH-based estimate of  conditional 
volatility. The major difference was with US stock returns volatility measured using 
the GARCH model showed the presence of  causality due to G6 terror attacks over 
the entire quantile range considered, which was not picked up by squared returns. 
Also, the causal relationships for Japan and UK due to own terror attacks and US 
terror attacks based on the GARCH-estimated measure of  volatility was stronger 
(covered the entire quantile range) compared to the corresponding cases with 
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squared returns. We believe that because squared returns as a measure of  volatility 
follows directly from the k-th order test and is independent of  a model-based 
estimate of  volatility (which could vary depending on what model we choose), the 
use of  squared returns is more appropriate in our context. Hence, the formal 
discussion of  the the recovered conditional volatility from univariate GARCH 
models have been avoided here to prevent extending the length of  the paper, but 
these results are available upon request from the authors; 
(iv) Finally, to accommodate for the possibility of  an important omitted variable like the 
VIX, we undertook an indirect approach of  testing the robustness of  our causality-
in-quantiles test. Unlike linear test of  causality, which can be multivariate, all known 
nonlinear tests of  causality are in fact bivariate (see for example, Heimstra and Jones 
(1994), Diks and Panchenko (2005), Nishiyama et al., (2011), Jeong et al., (2011)). 
Our indirect approach involves two steps: First, we estimate a linear causality model 
with VIX only in the regression; and second, recover the residuals from this model 
and apply our nonparametric causality-in-quantiles test on these residuals. So, the idea 
here is to create a filtered series for the stock returns, whose movements are now no 
longer due to the VIX.  Note that, using the VIX implies that we can start only in 
1986 at the earliest, with the data sourced from the FRED database of  the Federal 
Reserve Bank of  St. Louis.9 We observed that, whether we use the actual returns 
series or the filtered series (errors), results are qualitatively similar, suggesting that 
incorporating (indirectly) the information from the VIX does not tend to affect our 
causal relationship obtained for stock returns and volatility. However, there are 
couple of  exceptions when analysing own-country terror attacks and US terror 
attacks: causality for stock returns of  Germany (Japan) is lost (gained) when we 
consider the filtered series instead of  actual stock returns. In addition, when we 
compare our original set of  results obtained under the longer samples for Canada, 
Germany, Japan, UK and the US, we again tend to see the impact of  terror attacks is 
primarily concentrated in causing returns rather than volatility.  Since our results are 
virtually unchanged with the indirect inclusion of  the VIX, these have not been 
formally reported in the paper to save space, but are available upon request from the 
authors.       
                                                          
9 Prior to 1990, i.e., when the VIX data starts, we merge the VXO data to start in 1986. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
The results we have reported in this research contribute to the growing literature on the effects 
of  terror attacks on financial markets. We have contributed to this research by using a novel non-
parametric causality-in-quantiles test to inspect the effect of  terror attacks on the quantiles of  
the conditional distribution of  stock-market returns and volatility, both at a national and at an 
international level. We have found strong evidence of  causality for stock-market returns, with the 
exceptions of  France and Japan. We further have found that the evidence in favour of  the causal 
effect of  terror attacks tends to become stronger for the lower and the upper quantiles of  the 
conditional distribution of  stock-market returns. We have found evidence that terror attacks (at 
home or on the U.S.) move volatility only for Japan and the UK at several quantiles mainyl above 
the median. In addition, we also found that our results continue to hold for various robustness 
checks involving other tests like nonlinear causality and GARCH models, longer lag-lengths, 
alternative measure of  variance and possible omitted variables like the VIX.  
Our results have important implications given that stock-market return and volatility (often 
interpreted as a measure of  uncertainty) are among the most important indicators for capital 
budgeting and portfolio-management decisions because they directly reflect how market 
participants assess companies’ financial health and future prospects (Poon and Granger, 2003; 
Rapach and Zhou, 2013). Our results indicate that terror attacks can predict stock-market returns 
in many cases mainly during strong bear and bull-periods as defined in terms of  returns drawn 
from tails of  the conditional distribution of  stock returns. At the same time, terror attacks have 
no significant predictive value for uncertainty (that is, volatility measured in terms of  squared 
returns) in the stock market of  G7 countries, with Japan and the UK being notable exceptions. 
As an avenue of  future research, it would be interesting to extend our analysis to a forecasting 
model because in-sample predictability does not necessarily guarantee predictability over an out-
of-sample period (Rapach and Zhou, 2013). 
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Figure 1a. G7 Stock Returns 
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Figure 1b. G7 Terror Index 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
  Stock Returns 
  Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US 
 Mean 0.028 0.015 0.025 -0.006 0.018 0.016 0.026 
 Std. Dev. 0.955 1.403 1.257 1.566 1.299 1.338 1.062 
 Skewness -0.886 -0.141 -0.247 -0.074 -0.425 -16.317 -1.019 
 Kurtosis 16.760 8.293 10.140 6.905 12.677 810.363 29.123 
 Jarque-Bera 76715.98 8135.22 25153.05 2743.42 43628.56 213000000.0 337407.30 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Terror Index 
 Mean 1.002 1.041 1.002 1.017 1.004 1.016 1.020 
 Std. Dev. 0.063 0.172 0.034 0.100 0.089 0.118 0.146 
 Skewness 57.187 8.262 29.355 10.646 62.741 20.875 18.646 
 Kurtosis 3920.672 113.110 1110.038 214.717 4905.802 687.740 557.428 
 Jarque-Bera 6.12E+09 3590049 6.03E+08 8132931 1.11E+10 1.54E+08 1.52E+08 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Observations 9566 6950 11785 4311 11095 7848 11795 
Note: Std. Dev stands for standard deviation; Probability indicates the probability of  the null hypothesis of  
normality corresponding to the Jarque-Bera statistic.  
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Figure 2: Individual Effect of  Terror Attacks on G7 Stock Returns 
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Figure 3: Effect of  Terror Attacks on the US on the Stock Returns of  the other G7 
Countries  
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Figure 4: Effect of  Terror Attacks on the other G7 countries on the Stock Returns of  the 
US 
 
 
 
 
